We analyze in this study investor trading behavior based not on information related assumptions but on the search model of Vayanos and Wang (2007) . Our study shows that search cost dictates trading polarization across investors, firm size and time of day. We find that individual investors prefer to trade at market open, while institutional investors trade more heavily near market close. Trading costs indicate that it is less costly for institutional investors to trade large cap stocks at market close than at open. Search cost is related significantly to order-based market liquidity measures depending on time of day, market capitalizations and investor type.
I. Introduction
Trading liquidity of investors has been studied more in literature as the popularity of order-driven trading mechanism rises. While a poorer liquidity measure, such as higher bid-ask spread, is considered a result of less active trading, Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007) argued that limit order book provides information on future volatility in the market. A leading theory of liquidity is based on asymmetric information. Many studies, including Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , suggest that wider bid-ask spread in a specialist market is often used to compensate against information disadvantage. Information argument, however, does not apply in many situations, such as in an emerging market, where individual investors are the majority, trading preference in timing and stock characteristics is closely related to investor type. Individual investors prefer to trade small cap stocks not because of its poor informational content or low transparency in corporate governance, but due to their lower price and hence smaller amount of funds needed to trade a given quantity. We show in this study that individual investors prefer to trade relatively small cap stocks right after market opens, while foreign institutional investor (FII) and domestic institutional investor (DII) tend to trade large cap stocks more heavily near market close, for reasons unrelated to information.
Vayanos and Wang (2007, VW) introduced a search-based model of asset trading, where search or trading cost differs and investors are constrained financially. In a search-based equilibrium of VW, liquidity in a specific market, measured by search costs, can be the result of investor characteristics, regulations and local custom, rather than information or diversification. In such an equilibrium, buyers anticipating to find a matching seller easily are willing to pay a higher price than in an otherwise situation. Sellers, while knowing this, would submit orders with more dispersed offer prices, as a form of economic rent, on the limit book. Order-based liquidity measure such as offer price dispersion, limit book depth and bid-offer difference can thus be considered as reflecting the economic rent.
We attempt to analyze in this study investor trading behavior in a stock market without relying on any information related presumptions. Specifically, we analyze in the study how different types of investor choose when to trade in any given trading day, and provide explanations to it based on a search model of trading according to VW. Our study shows that comparative advantage in search cost dictates a polarization of trading activity across investors, firm size and time of day. We find that, in the Taiwan stock market, individual investors prefer to trade right after market opens, but foreign and domestic institutional investors trade more heavily near market close. From the perspective of search equilibrium, search cost is related significantly to order-based market liquidity measures depending on time of day, market capitalizations and investor type. The results is a compromise between how easy it is to locate a counterparty and how much execution cost an investor is willing to accept given the distribution of order book at certain juncture.
We study intraday trading behavior involving search cots across individuals, foreign and domestic institutions. Our empirical results suggest that search cost is low during market opening period and goes down afterward. Individuals' search cost is low especially in trading small cap stocks at market open, while search cost for foreign and domestic institutions is relatively low in trading large cap stocks near market close. Yang and Zhang (2007) showed how marginal institutional investors engage in short-term trading due to cost factors compared to other institutional investor going after long-term values of stocks. The short horizon of a marginal FII may have induced them to concentrate in trading stocks with the said characteristics.
The main implication of our results would help, on the one hand, investors in general to locate at any given period the most cost-efficient market to trade, which lowers average trading cost and enhance market trading volume 1 . On the other hand, our analysis contributes to regulators as well as exchanges if certain extreme search environment entails ramification or any other actions.
Unnecessary market alarms could be greatly reduced and market efficiency is thus improved. A brief literature review and discussion of how to measure search cost, as well as order-based liquidity, are given in Section II. Data and empirical results are laid out in Section III. Conclusion is given in Section IV.
II. How does search activity affect trading?
The competitive equilibrium of informed trading introduced by Back, Cao and Willard (2000) suggests that heavy trading occurs when informed traders compete in aggressive trading with correlated information when market opens, where more market depth is observed than the rest of the session. As market approaches its close, trading becomes heavy again as informed traders aggressively exploit their remaining private information. This model explains in part intraday trading patterns, as well as trading concentration. Hu (2006) suggests that an information-only argument is more applicable in quote-driven markets where trade initiation reflects nature of information. In an order-driven market, dynamic frictional costs, in the sense of Stoll (2000) , have to be taken into account. Hu (2006) find that frictional costs are the smallest at market open, consistent with our findings on the polarization of trading activity.
In emerging financial markets, turnover and market volume are often generated by individual investors. Trading of individuals is worth studying in these markets as it interacts much with institutional investors, as suggested in Barber 
Search Model of Trading
VW proposed a model with two assets traded in two markets respectively. More trading could be generated by shorter horizons as it reduces search times and trading costs. Switching rates could correspond to buyers' characteristics, such as long horizon is more relevant to insurance companies, while shorter ones belong to hedge funds. A clientele equilibrium is where one market not only has more sellers, but also more buyers as well as a higher buyer-seller ratio than the other. Moreover, the price in the more active market is thus higher and buyers' search times are shorter. Investors with high switching rates, who have a stronger preference for short search times, prefer the more active market despite the higher prices. On the other hand, low-switching-rate investors, who are more patient, value more the lower prices in the less active market. So in essence, cost characteristics of investors determine concentration of trading and prices, rather than information about the assets. Individual investors trading for own accounts with unleveraged funds are supposed to have lower switching rates and prefers a less active market. However, when market moves fast, lack of knowledge could elevate their switching rates so they turn to the other market instead.
Although FII's hold about one third of the total values of Taiwanese stocks, their overall turnover rate is in general at around 10% monthly only. The positive relation between holdings and turnover within given periods presented by Ting (2009) suggest that marginal FII's are incurring risk-adjusted cost situation as discussed in Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2007) . These marginal FII's are under shorter horizons due to liquidity reasons related to allocating funds across borders.
A measure of order dispersion
Two forms of liquidity measures will be used in this study. Both of them are based on order prices submitted to the market. Limit order book dispersion describes the tightness of the book by examining how far apart from each other (or from the mid-quote) the limit orders are placed in the book. Foucault, Kadam, and Kandel (2005) suggest that the limit order book dispersion is linked with the patience of limit order traders. We adopt the following measure by modifying the dispersion measure of Kang and Yeo (2008) . The dispersion measure of stock i in a given day is where Tick i is the tick size of the respective stock. w , the size of the corresponding buy or sell limit orders. For the whole market, transaction prices are used to compute the first price interval, while for each type of investors, average of buy and sell order price at each priority level is used instead. This dispersion measure is designed to show how clustered or dispersed the limit orders are in the book. It measures how tightly orders are placed to each other or how closely they are to the mid-quote. The higher the dispersion is, the less tight the book is, and the lower amount of liquidity the limit order book provides.
In the Taiwan market, due to funding liquidity, individual investors tend to hold and trade stocks with lower prices, while institutional investors concentrate more on high price stocks. 
A measure of order book depth
Bloomfield, O'Hara, and Saar (2005) argue that informed traders would submit more limit orders than market orders in an electronic market. McKenzie (2007) argued that in the emerging markets especially the ability to forecast future price movements is related to the depth of those markets. Therefore, beside the tightness measure, limit order book helps examining how well the book handles large volume of market orders. A deep limit order book can absorb a sudden surge in the demand of liquidity without inducing much price deviation. Without the interference of the specialist and before new limit orders can replenish the book, market buy (sell) orders will first be executed against the limit sell (buy) orders at the best offer (bid) quote. If the volume of the market order(s) is larger than the best offer (bid) size, the remainder of the unexecuted market orders will be executed against the limit orders queuing at the next best offer (bid) quote. In other words, large volume of market buy (sell) orders will walk up (down) the limit order book to get filled. The further away the market orders walk up or down the book, the larger the difference between the execution price and the mid-quote is, and therefore the more costly the trading process will be for the market order traders. Motivated by the mechanism described above, we design the cost-to-trade measure, which can be thought of as an enhanced depth measure for the limit order book.
where i=1,2,…,525. 
III. Data and empirical results
This study employs intra-day order book data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange starting from Exchange does not allow market order, so the limit order book covers the entire body of orders submitted by all investors. Each data record includes date, exact time in hours, minutes and seconds, stock code, price and quantity of all orders, filled or not, submitted during the data period.
Individual stock returns, market capitalizations, daily turnover and price-book ratios are obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.
We divided each daily session, between 9:00 AM and 1:30 PM, into 9 intervals with 30 minutes in each interval. This is because trading volume varies much across the day. Gunduz and Hatemi-J (2005) also suggested that, price and volume relation is important in emerging markets.
As our data contains flags identifying each investor as either an individual, an FII or a DII, we are able to extend our analysis according to investor type. Over the last ten years, percentage of trades accounted for by FIIl has apparently grown much faster than the DII. As a matter of fact, FII'S owns one third of the total market capitalization and account for one quarter of daily volume as of end of 2008 in Taiwan. Table I To further compare how investors choose a time to trade, we examine in Table II the average number of shares in each buy or sell order, for the entire session as well as the opening and the closing intervals. Although these two intervals are where we see the heaviest trading in any given day, the order size submitted by the market as a whole is larger right before market closes. Out of the three types of investors, FII is the only one submitting more heavily at market close, with order size averaging almost three times that in the opening period. However, the overwhelming number of individual investors placing orders in the opening interval generates 51% more individual's orders than in the closing interval, as seen in Table I .
In order to identify where the heavier orders are allocated, we show in Table III the transaction volume of FII and DII across market capitalizations, as well as percentages of their holdings in the respective category of shares. In the category of shares with the lowest market cap, the market as a whole trades on average 6.63 thousand shares in any given stock and any day. But for shares in the largest market cap category, the average market trading volume is more than 7 times as much. FII's, when they do trade, trade about 5.5 times that of market average in stocks with the smallest cap and 135 times as much in stocks of the largest firms. DII's also trade much more actively than market average, but not as much as FII's. This difference is consistent with results in Table II as well as institutional holdings of outstanding shares of stocks in each capitalization category. FII's trade extremely heavily on large cap stocks because they hold a substantial percentage of them. Despite the average order size is extremely large, the average trading volume for large cap stocks is still high, reflecting possible ease in finding counterparty.
The model of VW provides a framework where search costs dictate market equilibrium and how active trading takes place there. Investors with shorter investment horizon would more likely choose to trade when more buyers and sellers are around, which leads to shorter search time.
Equilibrium price should be higher than otherwise as buyer-seller ratio is also high there. Table IV gives summary statistics of measures consistent with the VW model. We consider BFT and SFT as proxies for search time of buy and sell orders respectively. The former is the average number of seconds it takes to fill a certain buy order within the period of interest, while the latter is that to fill a sell order. The distribution of BFT and SFT across the day indicates that search time at market open is the shortest during among all intervals, while search time is the longest when market is about to close. The sharp increase in search time across the day is not proportional to the number of active investors in each intraday interval as reported in Table I BSD, defined as the difference between the best bid and offer price averaged across all incidences with a realized transaction price, over the intraday interval of interest. In a quote-driven market, this is equivalent to bid-ask spread quoted by a dealer. However, the intraday distribution of BSD is inconsistent with our natural expectation of bid-ask spread. In Table IV , BSD at market open, when trading is the heaviest, appears to be the highest than the rest of the day, and there is also a rebound right before market close. The correlation between BSD and market trading volume for the entire data period is, however, -0.24, conforming to common regularity. It is worth special attention that, for the smallest firms, the offer price difference is substantially higher than that for firms with large size in all intervals except in the opening one. Also, for the largest firms, BSD is significantly Table IV can be further clarified if we examine the block across major investor groups using more sophisticated measures constructed from the limit order book for the data period of the study. Table V reports the distribution of composite order price dispersion measure, OPD, using the same time-size blocks as in Table IV . As the computed value of measure is affected in practice by the arrival rate of orders within a given time, figures in the table is modified to reflect the percentage each cell in the block is above or below corresponding daily averages. Order price dispersion reported here follows a pattern opposite to that of search time in Table IV Table I , the block distribution by investor type in Table IV suggests that, across time of day, order price dispersion benefits trading. But in the category of individuals, it benefits more when trading stocks of the smaller firms, while for institutional investors higher dispersion benefits trading stocks of larger firms. This kind of clientele distribution of trading activity is not compatible with information-based explanation, especially why order price dispersion is higher, at market open, when trading is extremely heavy. However, if OPD is just a form of economic rent imposed by limit order traders to reflect the benefits each trader can enjoy through shorter search time, then the VW search equilibrium justifies why OPD should be negatively, rather than positively, related to search time. From this perspective, OPD has different implications from BSD, with the former serving as a necessary rather than sufficient condition for search-based trading concentration.
Trading behavior of individuals has often been considered as different from that of institutional investors. Considered alternatively in a search-cost driven market, the divergence of trading behavior may still exist. In the view of VW, search cost is important because investors are constrained in choosing assets to hold or trade. In many of the emerging markets, individuals with limited funds tend to trade infrequently on small cap stocks whose low liquidity, to go after potentially higher returns. Institutional, especially foreign and western, investors possess ample funds, so they are also constrained to trade or hold large cap stocks for depth and the likelihood of finding counterparty. Unlike FII's and DII's, OPD for individuals in Table V According to Table VI, the distribution of the second order-price-based measure, though created to gauge depth of a limit order book, is also compatible with our findings in previous tables.
CTT falls in general with both time of day and firm size, uniformly across all types of investors.
Although stocks of larger firms possess better depth, orders from individuals have on average more depth than those from institutional investors. At market open, this edge is about 2.4 times, and increases to 3.9 times at market close. Along the direction of firm size, individuals' edge in order book depth at market open is 2.1 times on small cap and 2.3 times on large cap, but is 3.7 times and 2.7 times respectively at market close. So the results on order book depth measure in Table VI implies that it is in the interest of FII's and DII's to trade large cap stocks, especially at market close.
For individuals, order book depth indicated they should make the similar trading decision as the institutional investors to avoid higher execution cost in trading small cap stocks at market open.
However, the search cost advantage dominates the execution cost. Apparently, for individuals finding a counterparty to complete an intended trade is more important than walking up a few ticks on the limit order book and paying for a slightly higher transacted price. After all, not being able to submit a market order in the Taiwan market is itself a strong protection against shallow limit order book. Besides, there is also a 7% price limit on either direction. Actual trading intensity may depend in part on the relative strength of search and execution costs.
Based on a framework of time-size block, we have used search cost argument to support the observed diagonal polarization of trading activity among individual and institutional investors in the market. Comparative advantage causes investors to trade in a more beneficial environment than otherwise by weighing between search and execution costs. The relation is, however, on the level of broad categories. To determine on average what dictates search equilibrium at every incidence, we need to conduct further point estimation on search time and its driving factors. We use the following model to find out how order price dispersion affects actual time it takes to fill a buy order. A fixed effect panel regression based on
is conducted, where BFT and BSD are the same as those defined for Table IV , and OPD is the same as that defined in (2). In (3), BSD is included as a control variable. Although the results in Table IV show that the pattern of BSD within the time-size block is contrary to that of BFT, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) imply that BSD should be positively related to BSD. Table VII indicate that overall and for all major types of investors, BSD does affect BFT positively, with an exception in the opening interval. The explanation is related to the fact that, in Table IV , BSD happens to have a local minimum at the upper left hand corner of the time-size block. Within that cell, search factor is so strong that it drives up expectation for future offer price, hence current bid offer price difference.
In Table VII , the coefficient for OPD is negative within the first two hours of trading for individuals.
Larger order price dispersion, arising from the expectation of lower search cost, causes shorter execution time to fulfill that expectation in those periods. Later on as that expectation weakens, execution time is lengthened due to dispersed ordered prices which are hard to fill. Note that in Table VII the expectation effect from search factor can last till mid-session for individuals, indicating that it is more difficult to interpret a large limit order book.
Similar analysis is conducted for SFT, the execution time for sell orders, according to the following fixed effect panel regression model,
The results for the model above are reported in Table VIII , which are somewhat different from those for BFT as seen in VII. The coefficients for BSD in the case of both FII's and DII's are uniformly negative across the entire day. This suggests that their best offer price tend to increase faster than the best bid price, so sell orders can be filled faster even when BSD rises. Similar reason applies for the coefficients of OPD. Greater order price dispersion always makes it easier to execute an sell order, whether there are more or fewer institutional investors selling in the market.
Model (3) is then modified for analysis, regardless of investor type, across firm size according to (5) ,
. Table IX gives the results of (5), where coefficients for BSD and OPD are quite similar to those in Table VII . However, the effect of OPD in large caps last longer into the day. As institutional investors often place no more than two order prices, which vary rapidly, on either the bid or offer side, higher OPD on large cap orders could always suggest more active trading and hence shorter execution time. For the small cap stocks, higher OPD later on in the day is caused by more order price farther away from mid-quote, therefore it cannot help expediting execution when there are not enough individual investors. The coefficients for CTT reflect that for large caps near market close better order book depth intensifies the search cost advantage over the execution cost disadvantage, further affirming the polarized trading activity implied by Table X gives the results of (6), which are somewhat different from those in 
V. Conclusion
This study presents a set of intra-day order book data to study trading behavior in the securities market. We adopted a search model specifically ideal for exploring our detailed order data. We attempt to analyze in this study investor trading behavior in a stock market without relying on any information related presumptions. Our study shows that comparative advantage in search cost dictates a polarization of trading activity across investors, firm size and time of day. We find that, in easy it is to locate a counterparty and how much execution cost an investor is willing to accept given the distribution of order book at certain juncture.
Although we have presented valid arguments regarding the central issue of this study, there are areas we do have to work on to enrich our study with.
We have yet to investigate further order submission detail in individual stocks to support the search cost model. Other analysis, such as trading motives of investors, evidence on sequence or development of trading concentration and the dynamics of search equilibrium could be added to an extension as well.
Footnotes
1. This is indeed consistent with Hu (2006) where it was shown that the participation of individual investor helps reducing frictional costs.
2. While constructing the measure of OPD, we examined in detail the limit order book and find that FII's and DII's rarely submit more than two bid or offer prices at any transaction even in the case of large cap stocks. There are no limit order prices at all for stocks not with the largest firm size. These are all indications of market order submission. 
Table IV Summary Statistics of Intraday Indicators for VW Search Equilibrium
Sample means across 525 firms over 461 trading days Indicators used in this study to explore the search equilibrium in VW include search time, number of buy and sell orders and buyer/seller ratio. The search times of buy and sell orders are proxied by, BFT and SFT respectively. The former is the average number of seconds it takes to fill a buy order within the period of interest, while the latter is that to fill a sell order. Average numbers of buy and sell orders submitted to the market are denoted by BOC and SOC. BSR is the ratio between total buy and sell orders for a given stock on a given day, and is used to proxy the buyer to seller ratio in VW. BSD is the difference between the best bid and offer price in the market, averaged over the time period of interest.
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